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Canada’s Empirically-Based Child 
Competency Test and its Principled 
Approach to Hearsay 
Nicholas Bala* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE VALUE OF A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
For those interested in law reform or a better understanding 
of the value and limitations of their own legal regime, there is 
great utility in considering the approaches taken in other 
jurisdictions to common legal and social problems.  This paper 
offers a comparative perspective on some of the controversies 
surrounding the treatment of child witnesses, focusing on two 
areas in which Canadian law has undergone substantial reform 
and significantly differs from United States law:  (1) legislation 
governing the competence of children to testify; and (2) the 
common law rules governing the admission of hearsay evidence, 
especially concerning children’s out-of-court statements regarding 
abuse. 
As in the United States, over the past three decades there 
have been dramatic changes in Canada in the understanding of 
child abuse, as well as great increases in the number of reported 
cases of both historic and contemporary child abuse cases, 
especially child sexual abuse.  There have also been very 
substantial changes in how the justice system treats children.  
Until the 1980s, Canadian law was premised on the view that 
child witnesses were inherently unreliable, and very little effort 
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was made to accommodate these witnesses in the courts.1  In the 
1980s, the justice system began to respond to the growing 
understanding of the nature and extent of child abuse, and to the 
growing body of psychological research on the reliability of child 
witnesses.2 As a result, judges and legislators have introduced 
many substantive, evidentiary, and procedural reforms, which 
have resulted in many more successful prosecutions in cases in 
which children are witnesses.3 
This article discusses two areas of major reform in the laws 
concerning children and other vulnerable witnesses in Canada.  
The first is the amendment of the legislation governing the 
competence of witnesses to testify, and the second is changes in 
the common law rules governing hearsay.  In both of these areas, 
developments in social science research have had an important 
role in shaping law reform.  Similar to lawmakers in the United 
States, lawmakers in Canada have struggled with balancing the 
need to expand the scope for admission of evidence through child 
witnesses and to facilitate the search for the truth in the justice 
system against protection of the rights of the accused.  However, 
in these two areas, the Canadian law may have reached a 
preferable balance; a balance that more faithfully reflects the 
growing body of research on child development and the capacities 
of children without sacrificing the rights of the accused.  Of 
course, in each country this balancing occurs in the context of its 
own constitutional framework.  Still, Canadian legislators and 
judges have taken a more accommodative approach to child 
witnesses, which makes the justice system more responsive to 
children’s needs and capacities. 
II.  THE CANADIAN CONTEXT 
A. Constitutional & Legal Contexts 
For the purposes of this comparative study, it is worth 
providing American readers with a very brief introduction to 
Canada’s legal system.  Canada is a federal country, but unlike 
the United States, where the primary responsibility for the 
enactment criminal laws is a state responsibility, the Parliament 
 1.   See infra Part II(b) of this article.  
 2.   See id. 
 3.   See infra Parts III and IV of this article.  
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of Canada has the jurisdiction to enact all laws governing 
substantive criminal offenses, as well the procedural and 
evidentiary rules governing criminal trials.4  The use of jury trials 
is much less common in Canada than the United States and 
criminal jury trials are restricted to cases where the sentence 
could be five years or longer.5  In general, Canadian sentencing 
policies are less punitive than in the United States.  In fact, in 
some cases, the prosecution (known as “the Crown” in Canada) 
may decide to seek a sentence of less than five years just to spare 
a child victim the prospect of testifying in a jury trial.  
Additionally, it is not uncommon for a defendant to waive his right 
to a jury trial, even in more serious sexual offenses cases where 
the accused faces a long sentence.  Thus, in practice jury trials are 
relatively rare.  However, as in the United States, the rules of 
evidence for criminal cases are, at least in theory, premised on the 
use of a jury. 
Canada only introduced a constitutionally entrenched Charter 
of Rights (“Charter”) in 1982.6  The Canadian Charter recognizes 
similar fundamental rights as in the United States Constitution,7 
such as freedom of religion and the right to equal protection of the 
law.  One exception is that the Charter has no equivalent to the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms.8  Additionally, some of the 
provisions of the Canadian constitutional guarantees have 
different wording from their corresponding American provisions.  
And, even in situations where there is nearly identical language, 
the Canadian courts may interpret that language differently.9  
 4.  Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, app. II, no. 11, s. 91(27) (Can.). 
 5.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, s. 11(f) (U.K.). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1 (2d ed. 2010) (providing an introduction to comparative 
legal studies).  
 8.  See R. v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 398, 414 (Can.).  For a series 
of articles comparing the Canadian and American constitutions, see 
Symposium, Comparative United States/Canadian Constitutional Law, 55 
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1992).  
 9.  Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Ties That Bind? The Supreme Court 
of Canada, American Jurisprudence, and the Revision of Canadian Criminal 
Law Under the Charter,  28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 729, 742–44, 778 (1990); 
Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums: The 
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Nonetheless, Canadian courts regularly cite American precedents 
when dealing with constitutional issues, and American courts 
likewise, have cited to Canadian cases on certain issues, notably 
those related to same-sex marriages.10 
Additionally, at the time of arrest, the police in Canada are 
constitutionally obliged to afford similar rights to the arrestee as 
those arrested in the United States.  For example, in Canada 
there are also restrictions on search, detention, and police 
interrogation, as well as provisions that a detained person has the 
right to counsel and the right to seek bail.11  The criminal trial 
process in Canada also has a constitutionally guaranteed set of 
rights and protections, including the right against self-
incrimination.12  Finally, of significance for this paper, while every 
person charged with an offense in Canada has to be “presumed 
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,”13 the 
Canadian Charter does not have an explicit “confrontation clause.”  
Thus, while the accused person in Canada is granted very similar 
rights as the accused person in the United States, in Canada, the 
accused does not have a constitutional guarantee to confront the 
witnesses against him, including child witnesses.14 
Before turning to the specific legal issues that are the primary 
subject of this paper, I offer a brief overview of the developments 
over the past three decades in the understanding and awareness 
of child abuse, and the corresponding changes in the Canadian 
criminal justice system regarding the treatment of children.  
These developments are broadly similar in both the United States 
and Canada, as well as in many other jurisdictions throughout the 
Supreme Court Of Canada, American Jurisprudence and the Continuing 
Revision of Criminal Law Under the Charter, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 39–40, 
67–69 (1992) (arguing that, on balance, a defendant has a more extensive set 
of constitutionally protected rights in Canada than in the USA).   
 10.  See, e.g., Rosen v. R., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 961, 968 (Can.) (discussing the 
similarities and differences of the protection against coerced confessions 
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause in the Canadian Bill of Rights); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 
(2003) (discussing Canada’s approach to same-sex relationships).  
 11.  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 
11, ss. 8–11 (U.K.).  
 12.  Id. s. 13.  
 13.  Id. s. 11(d).  
 14.  See U.S. CONST.  amend. VI.  
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world.15 
B. Changing Understandings of Child Abuse & Reforming Child 
Witness Laws 
The historic English common law that is the basis of the 
criminal law in both the United States and Canada was premised 
on the belief that children are inherently untrustworthy witnesses 
and are prone to making false allegations of sexual abuse.  Thus, 
the rules about child witnesses were based on the prevailing social 
and legal myths of the late nineteenth century that children were 
inherently unreliable witnesses and that sexual abuse of children 
was a rare occurrence.16  These laws were also based on the 
opinions of early psychological researchers about the unreliability 
of children; however, these views have since been totally 
discredited as being based on biased clinical observations.17 
In 1893, around the time when the first child protection 
agencies were being established to help child victims of abuse or 
abandonment, Canada enacted its first legislation concerning 
child witnesses, permitting children to give “unsworn testimony,” 
allowing a child to testify without giving an oath to promise to tell 
the truth.18  However, children could only give unsworn testimony 
if they demonstrated their understanding of the “duty to speak the 
truth,” and additionally, such unsworn testimony required 
corroboration in order to convict the accused. Further, as late as 
1967, the Supreme Court of Canada cautioned that the common 
 15.  See generally John E. B. Myers, A Decade of International Legal 
Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps Toward a 
Child Witness Code, 28 PAC. L.J. 169 (1996).  
 16.  See, e.g., 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 505–509 (1904); 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, 
A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1821, 
1832 (1904). 
 17.  Carol Smart, A History of Ambivalence and Conflict in the Discursive 
Construction of the ‘Child Victim’ of Sexual Abuse, 8 SOC. LEG. STUD. 391, 
391, 399, 406 (1999). 
 18.  Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1893, c. 31, s. 25 (Can.).  In the 1908 
consolidation of the Act, this became Chapter 145, Section 16.  See Id. at c. 
145, s. 16.  In Canada, the federal Parliament has jurisdiction for the 
enactment of criminal laws—substantive, procedural and evidentiary, while 
the provinces have responsibility for the “administration of justice.”  The 
Judicial Structure, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Dec. 23, 2013, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/07.html.   
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law required jurors to be warned of the “inherent frailties” of a 
child’s testimony even if the child was a sworn witness.19  Until 
the end of the twentieth century, no efforts were made in Canada 
to modify court processes to facilitate children’s testimony. 
Because of this social and legal environment, relatively few 
reports of child abuse were made to the police or healthcare 
professionals, reinforcing the notion that child abuse was rare. 
Around the same time, the women’s movement of the 1970s 
helped support adult survivors of childhood abuse, initially mainly 
female victims, to feel comfortable enough to come forward with 
first-person accounts of their experiences.20  Encouraged by media 
reports and a growing professional sensitivity, by the 1980s larger 
numbers of adult survivors began to overcome their feelings of 
fear, guilt, and shame to disclose what had occurred to them in 
childhood.  In Canada, the 1984 release of the Badgley Committee 
Report substantially increased awareness of child sexual abuse.21  
This government-commissioned report documented the extent of 
child sexual abuse in Canada, revealed major failings in the 
responses to abuse, and made many recommendations for legal 
and social reforms.22 
By the late 1980s, the Canadian public was being shocked by 
detailed disclosures from adult survivors about child abuse in 
schools, juvenile institutions, churches and sporting organizations 
across the country.  Many of the cases involved some of society’s 
most vulnerable children, those without parents to protect them, 
placed by the state in child welfare institutions or in the since-
closed residential schools for Aboriginal children.23  Many children 
in these institutions were victims of abuse at the hands of 
teachers and supervisors, many of whom were ministers, priests 
 19.  R. v. Horsburgh, [1967] S.C.R. 746, 765, 778 (Can.). 
 20.  See JOHN E.B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
PRACTICE 29 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing how feminist movements, specifically 
the unprecedented numbers of women enrolling in law schools, contributed to 
unveiling issues in child sexual abuse).   
 21.  SEXUAL OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN IN CANADA: SUMMARY OF THE 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SEXUAL OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN AND 
YOUTHS 1 (1984). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, RESTORING DIGNITY: RESPONDING TO 
CHILD ABUSE IN CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS 12–13, 30 (2000).   
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or nuns.24  There was also growing awareness that child sexual 
abuse is often perpetrated by family members, close family friends 
or trusted community figures, such as priests, coaches and 
teachers.25 
As disclosures of abuse became more common, concerns about 
the inappropriateness of distrusting children’s evidence in the 
court system prompted new psychological research into the 
reliability of child witnesses.26  This research revealed that, when 
questioned in an appropriate way, children can be reliable 
witnesses and that even young children can distinguish fantasy 
from reality.27  With the growing awareness of the realities of 
abuse, a more receptive environment for disclosures of abuse by 
children developed, and children were encouraged to report abuse.  
As a result, reports of abuse by children increased dramatically, 
and the justice system had to deal with many children being 
brought forward as witnesses.  It became clear that fundamental 
legal reforms were required in order to permit children to testify 
properly.  Canada’s Parliament responded to the drastic increase 
in reports by enacting substantial reforms.  The first major 
statutory reforms came into force in 1988,28 with further 
significant legislative changes in 199329 and 2006.30  Discussed 
infra in further detail, these statutory reforms provided for better 
accommodation child witnesses, for example, allowing for the use 
of closed circuit television, as well as a change in the test for 
establishing the competence of child witnesses.  These statutory 
 24.  See id.  There have been a number of deeply disturbing public 
inquiries into child abuse in children’s institutions and schools in Canada.  
Id. at 1. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  See John E.B. Myers, Karen J. Saywitz & Gail S. Goodman, 
Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for 
Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 10–11, 13 
(1996). 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  See Nicholas Bala, Double Victims: Child Sexual Abuse and the 
Canadian Criminal Justice System, 15 QUEEN’S L J. 3, 3–4 (1990) (discussing 
the 1988 amendments). 
 29.  Young Offenders Act, S.C. 1993, c. 45, paras. 7, 9 (Can.).  
 30.  Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, as amended by S.C. 2005, 
c. 32, s. 27 (Can.); see also Nicholas Bala et al., Bill C-2: A New Law for 
Canada’s Child Witnesses, 32 CRIM. REP. (6th) 48 (2005) (discussing the 2005 
amendments), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries 
/cornwall/en/hearings/Exhibits/Nicolas_Bala/pdf/Bill_C-2.pdf. 
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reforms also allowed for admission of video-recorded evidence of 
statements of children. 
At the same time that the above-mentioned legislative 
reforms were being enacted, the courts also changed the common 
law evidentiary rules applicable to child witnesses. Among the 
changes, the courts reformed the hearsay rule and rules governing 
such matters as the admissibility of the accused’s prior history of 
abuse, known as the “similar fact rule.”31  Canadian courts also 
came to recognize that children can be reliable witnesses, and that 
it is unfair and inappropriate to have general rules discounting 
their evidence. Thus, in 1988, the Canadian Parliament abrogated 
the statutory rule that the unsworn testimony of a child needed to 
be corroborated,32 though some judges continued to apply the 
common law warning rule, advising juries about the “inherent 
frailty” of the testimony of children, whether sworn or unsworn.33  
Subsequently, the Canadian Supreme Court revisited the issue in 
1992 in R. v W.(R.), rejecting “the stereotypical but suspect” views 
about child witnesses, and abolishing the common law warning 
rule.34  Justice McLachlin observed: 
The law affecting the evidence of children has undergone 
changes in recent years. The first is removal of the 
notion, found at common law and codified in [repealed] 
legislation, that the evidence of children was inherently 
unreliable and therefore to be treated with special 
caution . . . The repeal of provisions creating a legal 
requirement that children’s evidence be corroborated does 
not prevent the judge or jury from treating a child’s 
evidence with caution where such caution is merited in 
the circumstances of the case. But it does revoke the 
assumption formerly applied to all evidence of children, 
often unjustly, that children’s evidence is always less 
reliable than the evidence of adults.35 
 
 31.  See, e.g., R. v Handy, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 (Can.). 
 32.  Criminal Code, S.C. 1993, c. 45, para. 9 (Can.).  
 33.  See, e.g., R. v. Hanna (1993), 80 CCC 3d 289, para. 62 (Can. 
B.C.C.A.) 
 34.  R. v. W. (R.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122, 132–33 (Can.). 
 35.  Id. 
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[Justice McLachlin] also alluded to the growing body of 
psychological literature on the reliability and perceptions of 
children: 
The second change in the attitude of the law toward the 
evidence of children in recent years is a new appreciation 
that it may be wrong to apply adult tests for credibility to 
the evidence of children. One finds emerging a new 
sensitivity to the peculiar perspectives of children. Since 
children may experience the world differently from 
adults, it is hardly surprising that details important to 
adults, like time and place, may be missing from their 
recollection . . . Every person giving testimony in court, of 
whatever age, is an individual, whose credibility and 
evidence must be assessed by reference to criteria 
appropriate to her mental development, understanding 
and ability to communicate.36 
The Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects a recognition that 
children can be as reliable as adults when recalling an incident, 
even though they may not be able to describe events in as much 
detail as adults and may be unable to answer some kinds of 
questions that adults can.  Despite their reliability, however, there 
is no presumption in favor of a child’s testimony.  Rather, a child’s 
testimony is to be individually assessed in the context of all of the 
other evidence. Furthermore, although there is no legal 
requirement for corroboration, and it is possible to obtain a 
conviction solely on the basis of the testimony of a young child (or 
even on hearsay evidence from a young child who is not competent 
to be a witness), it is clearly helpful to the Crown’s case to have 
some form of independent evidence to ‘support’ the child’s 
testimony.  This could be medical testimony, ‘similar fact evidence’ 
(evidence of other acts of abuse by the accused), or other evidence. 
Unfortunately in the 1980s, at the same time that genuine 
cases of abuse—both contemporary and historic—were being 
reported and victims began to receive support, in Canada (and 
other countries), there were also a relatively small number of 
allegations reported to the police that later proved to be 
unfounded. These cases typically were the result of the 
 36.  Id. at 133–34.  
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inappropriate actions by undertrained police investigators, 
therapists, or child welfare staff.  While there have been no 
documented cases in Canada of individuals being imprisoned as a 
result of false allegations of child abuse, there were a number of 
cases of clearly unfounded allegations that went to trial in both 
the criminal and family justice systems.  The most infamous 
Canadian case of unfounded allegations occurred in 1992 in 
Martensville, Saskatchewan, as a result of overzealous, 
inadequately trained police investigators engaging in 
inappropriate questioning to “encourage” young children to 
“disclose” suspected abuse.37  More than a dozen adults, including 
part of the small town’s police force, were charged of abusing 
several young children at a daycare center, though many of these 
charges were eventually cleared.38  Although relatively small in 
number, cases of unfounded allegations impose immense burdens 
on those falsely accused of abuse.39  The Martensville accusations 
demonstrated the need for careful investigations by properly 
trained investigators, a fair trial process that allows accusations 
to be properly tested, and an overall reminder that there should 
still be certain restraints on witnesses. 
III:  WITNESS COMPETENCE TO TESTIFY: CANADA EVIDENCE ACT 
SECTION 16.1 
A. Common Law and Early Statutory Reforms 
For centuries, the common law competency inquiry (or voir 
dire) was a critical, initial barrier that prevented many children 
from testifying.  At common law, a child was only permitted to 
testify if the child could be sworn, which required the child to 
demonstrate an understanding of the “nature and consequences” 
 37.  FRANN HARRIS, MARTENSVILLE: TRUTH OR JUSTICE: THE STORY OF THE 
MARTENSVILLE DAYCARE TRIALS (1998); see also R. v. Sterling (1995), 102 
C.C.C. 3d 481 (Sask. C.A.).  
 38.  See generally HARRIS, supra note 37.   
 39.  See Nicholas Bala et al., Sexual Abuse Allegations and Parental 
Separation: Smokescreen or Fire?, 13 J. FAM. STUD. 26, 28, 40. (2007).  One 
situation in which there is a persistently relatively high rate of unfounded 
allegations of child sexual abuse is in the context of parental separation; 
relatively of these cases result in criminal charges, but they pose major 
challenges and costs for parents in the family and child protection courts.  Id. 
at 26.   
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of an oath:  children were required to express knowledge of the 
fact that they would be committing a sin and “burn in the fires of 
hell” if they lied under oath.40  Since many younger children 
lacked the religious education, abstract thinking and 
communication ability to answer questions to demonstrate that 
they understood the nature of an oath, this rule often effectively 
precluded younger children in the United States, Canada, and 
England from testifying about their victimization.  This rule was 
based on the assumption that children who could not explain the 
meaning of the oath were less likely to tell the truth, and hence 
should not be permitted to testify.41 
However, around the beginning of the twentieth century, 
legislation was enacted in many common law jurisdictions to allow 
children to testify even if they could not answer questions about 
the oath, but their testimony may be discounted.  For instance, 
the 1893 Canada Evidence Act (“Evidence Act”) allowed a child to 
testify if the judge was satisfied that the child understood the 
“duty to speak the truth;” nevertheless, corroboration of unsworn 
testimony of a child was required to convict a person.42  Further, 
the inquiries under the 1893 Evidence Act into the question of 
whether a child understood the “duty to speak the truth” were 
often confusing and intimidating, and sometimes resulted in 
children who were capable of giving important evidence being 
prevented from testifying. Although case law eventually 
established that a child only had to appreciate the “social 
consequences” of promising, and not the spiritual consequences of 
the oath, to be permitted to testify,43 a study of Canadian 
practices in the late 1990s revealed that many judges continued to 
ask children questions about their understanding of an oath, 
 40.  R. v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.). 
 41.  Nicholas Bala et al., The Competency of Children to Testify: 
Psychological Research Informing Canadian Law Reform, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. 
RTS. 53, 54 (2010). 
 42.  Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1893, c. 31, s. 25 (Can.).  In the 1908 
consolidation of the Act and thereafter, this became Section 16. 
 43.  R. v. Fletcher (1982), 1 C.C.C. 3d 370, 380 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal 
to S.C.C. refused, [1983] 48 N.R. 319 (S.C.C.).  In R. v. F. (W.J.), Justice 
McLachlin commented on the "absurdity of subjecting children 
to examination on whether they understood the religious consequences of the 
oath." [1999] 3 S.C.R. 569, 591 (Can.).   
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including questions about their religious beliefs and observance.44  
Significantly, the unsworn testimony of a child required 
corroboration, which was often absent in cases where children 
were testifying about private victimization, as abuse typically 
occurs in private. 
Recognizing the ineffectiveness of the 1893 version of the Act, 
in 1988 the Canadian Parliament amended the law to abolish the 
requirement for corroboration of “unsworn evidence.”45 The 
amendments also provided that children who did not understand 
the nature of an oath could testify upon “promising to tell the 
truth,”46 if they had the “ability to communicate.”47  However, 
despite the amendments, judges continued to have an inquiry into 
children’s understanding of such concepts as “truth,” “lie,” and 
“promise” before children could testify,48 based on the assumption 
that if children could not explain these concepts, their promise 
would not have significance and they would be less likely to tell 
the truth.  Inevitably, young children, who think in concrete 
terms, had difficulty answering questions about these abstract 
concepts, and the competence inquiries tended to be longer and 
more confusing for them.49 
While the 1988 Evidence Act reforms were significant, 
fundamental problems for child witnesses still existed.  Research 
raised serious questions about the need to preclude children from 
testifying on the basis that they could not answer questions 
articulating the need for honesty, when adults are never 
precluded from testifying on this basis or even asked questions 
about it.  For instance, a survey of judicial attitudes in the late 
1990s revealed that many judges had discomfort with the 
competency process, in particular about the intrusive nature of 
the questions asked of children.50  In another study, Canadian 
judges reported that they believed that children were significantly 
 44.  Nicholas Bala et al., A Legal & Psychological Critique of the Present 
Approach to the Assessment of the Competence of Child Witnesses, 38 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 409, 411 (2000). 
 45.  Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 1987, c. 24, s. 18 (Can.). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See, e.g., R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223, 224–225 (Can.). 
 49.  See Nicholas Bala et al., R. v. M. (M.A.): Failing to Appreciate the 
Testimonial Capacity of Children, 40 CRIM. REP. (5th) 93 (2001). 
 50.  HARRIS, supra note 26, at 422. 
 
BALAFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  5:58 PM 
2014] CHILD COMPETENCY TEST 525 
more likely to be honest than adult witnesses, though recognizing 
that children, especially younger children, may be more prone to 
making errors due to poor memory or suggestibility.51 
B. Psychological Research and the 2006 Reforms 
There is now a growing body of psychological research about 
the potential of a child to lie and an adult’s ability to detect when 
children are lying.52  Commonly, children begin to lie starting 
around age three.53  Almost as soon as they start to lie, children 
learn that it is morally wrong to do so.  There is no evidence that 
younger children, in general, are more likely to lie than older 
children or adults, though they lie about different things.  
Further, a series of laboratory studies about the start of the 
millennium carried out by the author of this paper and his 
collaborators in Canada,54 and by American researchers like Tom 
Lyon,55 raised fundamental questions about the competency 
inquiry. Researchers have found no evidence to support the 
assumption that children’s ability to correctly answer cognitive 
questions about the meaning of “truth,” “lie,” and “promise” is 
related to whether or not they will actually lie or tell the truth.  
However, this research suggested that having a child “promise to 
tell the truth” before answering questions, even if the child could 
not correctly answer abstract questions about the meaning of the 
concepts involved, significantly increased the likelihood that a 
 51.  Nicholas Bala et al., Judicial Assessment of the Credibility of Child 
Witnesses, 42 ALTA L. REV. 995, 996–97 (2005). 
 52.  See, e.g., ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 7 (2d ed. 2008); AMINA MEMON, ALDERT VRIJ & RAY BULL, 
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND CREDIBILITY 42 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 53.  Angela D. Evans & Kang Lee, Emergence of Lying in Very Young 
Children, 49 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1958, 1958 (2013).  
 54.  See Victoria Talwar et al., Children's Conceptual Knowledge of Lying 
and its Relation to Their Actual Behaviors: Implications for Court Competence 
Examinations, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 395, 395 (2002).  See also Nicholas Bala 
et al., The Competency of Children to Testify: Psychological Research 
Informing Canadian Law Reform, 18 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 53, 53–54 (2002) 
(discussing the psychological research in fuller detail). 
 55.  See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young Maltreated 
Children’s Competence to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 16, 16 (1999); 
Thomas D. Lyon et al., Reducing Maltreated Children’s Reluctance to Answer 
Hypothetical Oath-taking Competency Questions, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV., 81, 81 
(2001).   
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child would tell the truth.56 
For ethical reasons, none of these laboratory-based studies 
involved questions about the abuse of children, but the results of 
these studies are consistent with child development theory and 
research, which recognizes that young children have a great deal 
of difficulty in correctly answering abstract questions about the 
meaning of a complex concept like the “promise to tell the truth.”57  
It is, however, clear from these studies that young children have a 
good understanding of the social importance of truth-telling and of 
promising, well before they can answer questions about the 
concepts.58  Children (and often adults) may be able to understand 
and correctly use words without being able to define them.  For 
both adults and children, the process of promising or swearing an 
oath is intended to impress on the witness and others in the court 
the social significance of the occasion; the oath or promise is a 
manifestation of a commitment to tell the truth.  Accordingly, 
while having a child promise to tell the truth provides no 
guarantee of the honesty of the child, it may do some good and 
certainly does no harm. 
In 2005, shortly after these studies were undertaken and the 
results published, a Canadian Parliamentary Committee 
considered new legislation to govern child witnesses in criminal 
cases.  The author of this paper testified at the hearings about this 
psychological research59 and, subsequently, the Committee 
introduced a new version of the Act, the Canada Evidence Act 
Section 16.1.  This version, which came into force in January 2006, 
provides that there is a presumption that children are competent 
to testify.60 While children are required to “promise to tell the 
truth” before being permitted to testify, Section 16.1(7) of the 
Evidence Act specifies that no child shall be “asked any questions 
regarding their understanding of the nature of the promise to tell 
the truth for the purpose of determining whether their evidence 
 56.  See supra notes 54, 55. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.  See id.  
 59.  Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness, 38th PARL., 1st Sess., No. 26 (Mar. 24, 2005) 
(statement of Nicholas Bala), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/House 
Publications/.Publication.aspx?DocId=1718347&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl
=38&Ses=1. 
 60.  Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 s. 16 (Can.). 
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shall be received by the court.”61 A party who challenges the 
competence of a child to testify bears the onus of proving to the 
court that there is a genuine issue about the child’s ability to 
communicate in court. In this case, if there is an inquiry, the sole 
test for competence is whether the child is “able to understand and 
respond to questions.”62 
Under the test of the “ability to understand and respond to 
questions,” the focus of the inquiry is on the child’s basic cognitive 
and language abilities.  This test is similar to the part of the 
inquiry under the 1988 provisions that focused on the child’s 
capacity to meaningfully communicate evidence in court.  As 
required by the Supreme Court in applying that test in R. v. 
Marquard,63 there now needs to be only relatively brief 
questioning to establish whether the child has the capacity to 
remember past events and answer questions about those events.  
The judge has a duty to ensure that the questions posed to the 
child during this inquiry and later in the proceedings are 
appropriate to the child’s stage of development, with age-
appropriate vocabulary and sentence structure.64 
The 2006 provisions simplified and shortened the process for 
qualifying children giving evidence in criminal cases.  A survey of 
Canadian judges about their experiences with the 2006 reforms 
revealed that 96% of the respondents agreed that the reform of the 
competency provision was “useful.”65 Judges reported that in a 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223, paras. 236–37 (Can.). 
 64.  See John Philippe Schuman et al., Developmentally Appropriate 
Questions for Child Witnesses, 25 QUEEN’S L.J. 251, 296–97 (1999).  
L'Heureux-Dubé J., advised: 
 the trial  judge has a responsibility to ensure that the child 
understands the question being asked and that the evidence given by 
the child is clear and unambiguous. To accomplish this end, the trial 
judge may be required to clarify and rephrase questions asked by 
counsel and to ask subsequent questions to the child to clarify the 
child's responses . . . the judge should provide a suitable atmosphere 
to ease the tension so that the child is relaxed and calm. 
R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 471 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
 65.  NICHOLAS BALA, JOANNE PAETSCH, LORNE BERTRAND & MEAGHAN 
THOMAS, TESTIMONIAL SUPPORT PROVISIONS FOR CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE 
ADULTS (BILL C-2): CASE LAW REVIEW & PERCEPTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY 48, 61 
(2011), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/famil/rr10_vic3 
/rr10_vic3.pdf. The survey was completed by thirty-four judges in four 
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significant portion of cases a child witness is accepted by the 
defense as competent without inquiry, often based on a video 
recording of a police interview with the child, disclosed to the 
defense before the hearing.66  Judges reported that there is a 
competency inquiry in about four-fifths of cases with the youngest 
age group (three to five years), which falls to about one quarter 
with the older age group (ten to thirteen years).67  The average 
time spent on a competency inquiry is now twelve minutes.68  In 
even the youngest age group (three to five years), almost one-half 
of the judges reported that they had never found a child 
incompetent under the new provision, although a few judges 
reported that a small number of children in all age groups were 
found incompetent because they could not meaningfully 
communicate in court about past events.69 
C. Upholding the Constitutionality of C.E.A. Section 16.1 
In a number of decisions rendered soon after Section 16.1 of 
the Canada Evidence Act came into force in 2006, trial courts 
upheld its constitutionality.  The trial courts concluded that the 
provision is consistent with an accused person’s rights to a fair 
trial and “in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.”70  Subsequently, in 2008, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal rendered the first appellate decision on this provision in R. 
v. J.S.71   
The Court of Appeal concluded that the provision reflects the 
procedural and evidentiary evolution of Canada’s criminal justice 
system, facilitating the testimony of children as a necessary step 
in its “truth-seeking goal,” and is constitutionally valid.  Justice 
jurisdictions.  Responses to the survey were collected between November 26, 
2007 and January 15, 2008.  Judges in the following courts were surveyed: 
Alberta Queen’s Bench and Provincial Court; British Columbia Provincial 
Court; Nova Scotia Supreme Court and Provincial Court; and Yukon 
Territorial Court.  The survey was distributed electronically and the response 
rate is not known, but was likely in the range of 10%–20%.  Id. at viii, 13.  
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See, e.g., R. v. Persaud, [2007] O.J. 432 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); R v. J.F. 
[2006] A.J. 972 (Can. A.B. Prov. Ct.). 
 71.  [2008] B.C.C.A. 401 (Can.), aff’g, R. v. J.S., [2007] B.C.J. 1374 (S.C.). 
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D.M. Smith wrote: 
I do not accept the . . . argument that if a moral obligation 
to tell the truth is not established, the testimony of the 
witness should be inadmissible. Parliament . . . has 
decided that a promise to tell the truth is sufficient to 
engage the child witness’s moral obligation to tell the 
truth.  Section 16.1 . . . discards the imposition of rigid 
pre-testimonial requirements which often prevented a 
child from testifying because of their inability to 
articulate an understanding of abstract concepts that 
many adults have difficulty explaining.  It reflects the 
[research] findings . . . that the accuracy of a child’s 
evidence is of paramount importance, not the ability of a 
child to articulate abstract concepts.72 
The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in R. v. 
J.S.,73 but in an unusual procedure, the Court dismissed the 
appeal from the Bench after hearing from the defendant without 
even hearing from the respondent Crown.74  The Supreme Court 
simply upheld the decision of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal but provided no reasons and gave no direct indication of its 
views about children and vulnerable witnesses, or the importance 
of social science research for determining the constitutional 
validity of the law.  Interestingly, however, two years later, the 
Supreme Court rendered an important decision regarding 
mentally disabled adults’ competency to testify, which showed 
that the Court is receptive to this type of social science research, 
as well as willing to recognize the capacity of vulnerable adults to 
relate stories of their victimization. 
D. Competency of Intellectually Disabled Adults:  R. v. D.A.I. 
While the amendments to the Evidence Act that came into 
effect in 2006 changed the process for allowing children under 
fourteen years of age to testify, for witnesses fourteen years or 
older, the previous legislative provisions remained in effect;75 
therefore, those fourteen years and older were presumed 
 72.  Id. para. 52–53. 
 73.  R. v. J.Z.S., [2008] S.C.C.A. 542, 542 (Can.). 
 74.  R. v. J.Z.S., [2010] S.C.R. 3, 3 (Can.).   
 75.  Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 16. 
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competent to testify.  The legislation specifies that if the mental 
competence of a witness is challenged, there shall be “an inquiry” 
into their understanding of the “nature of an oath.”  If the witness 
does not demonstrate an understanding of the nature of the oath, 
but is “able to communicate the evidence,” the witness may testify 
“on promising to tell the truth.”  This provision does not explicitly 
require an inquiry into the understanding of a mentally disabled 
adult or adolescent witness of the “promise to tell the truth.”  
However, unlike with those under fourteen years of age, there was 
no statutory prohibition on the asking of such questions, and pre-
2006 jurisprudence indicated that witnesses should be asked such 
questions.  The fact that this provision had not been changed by 
the 2006 amendments meant that mentally disabled adults, who 
are disproportionately victims of abuse, were often unable to 
testify about their victimization.  However, in its 2012 decision in 
R. v. D.A.I, the Supreme Court of Canada held that this provision 
should not be interpreted so as to require an inquiry into whether 
a developmentally challenged person understands the meaning of 
a promise to tell the truth.76  The Court effectively required the 
same competence standard for mentally disabled adults as 
Parliament provided for children. 
The D.A.I. case began when a nineteen-year-old 
developmentally-delayed woman who had the cognitive 
capabilities of a three- to six-year-old child was the alleged victim 
of sexual assault.77  The accused, who had been the live-in 
boyfriend of the victim’s mother, was charged with sexual 
assault.78  Using the traditional approach to Section 16(3) of the 
Canada Evidence Act, the trial judge determined that the 
complainant was not competent to testify, as she could not 
“communicate what truth involves or what a lie involves.”79  
Accordingly, the judge found that she did not demonstrate an 
understanding of the “duty to speak the truth.”80  That is, because 
she was unable to answer abstract, cognitive questions about the 
nature of the duty to speak the truth, she was not permitted to 
testify about what she remembered of the events in question.  As 
 76.  See R.  v. D.A.I., [2012] S.C.R. 149, para. 64 (Can.).   
 77.  R. v. D.A.I., [2008] O.J. No. 1823, para. 2 (Ont. S.C.). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  D.A.I., [2012] S.C.R. 149 at para. 10.   
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the alleged victim was not permitted to testify, the accused was 
acquitted, a decision affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.81 
However, in its January 2012 decision in R. v. D.A.I., the 
Supreme Court reversed the trial and appeal decisions, and 
ordered a new trial.82  Writing for a six to three majority, Chief 
Justice McLachlin held that if a witness whose mental capacity is 
challenged is unable to answer questions about the meaning of the 
“nature of the oath,” the judge should only consider whether the 
witness can communicate evidence about past events.83  If the 
answer to that question is yes, the judge should then simply ask 
the witness whether she promises to tell the truth.84  If she does, 
she is competent to testify.85  It is not necessary or appropriate to 
inquire whether the witness understands the duty to tell the 
truth.86  While noting that the 2006 reforms only specifically 
prohibited asking of children questions about their understanding 
of the concepts of promise, truth, and lie, the Court concluded that 
Parliament’s failure to extend this protection to mentally disabled 
adult witnesses did not mean that Parliament intended this 
questioning to continue for mentally disabled adults or older 
adolescents.87 
In coming to this conclusion, the Court considered the social 
science research, which had established that the ability of children 
to correctly answer cognitive questions about the “duty to speak 
the truth” is not related to whether or not they actually will tell 
the truth.  The Court held that there is an “equivalency” between 
the tests for assessing the competence of children and mentally 
disabled adults.88  Chief Justice McLachlin wrote: 
[The] final and most compelling . . . argument [in favor of 
equivalency] is simply this: when it comes to testimonial 
competence, precisely what, one may ask, is the 
difference between an adult with the mental capacity of a 
six-year-old, and a six-year-old with the mental capacity 
 81.  R. v. D.A.I., 2010 CanLII C48807, para. 51 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 82.  [2012] S.C.R. 149, para. 1 (Can.). 
 83.  Id. para. 28. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. para. 29. 
 87.  Id. para. 30. 
 88.  Id. para. 48. 
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of a six-year-old?  Parliament, by applying essentially the 
same test to both . . . implicitly finds no difference.  In my 
view, judges should not import one.89 
Thus, R. v. D.A.I. significantly extended the range of cases in 
which mentally disabled adults can testify about their 
victimization, and increased protection available to this 
vulnerable population. 
However, there are significant practical and ethical 
constraints which make it much more difficult to perform research 
with cognitively impaired adults than children. While there is a 
significant body of research about children as witnesses, their 
competence, suggestibility, credibility and so on, there is no 
research on cognitively disabled adults.  In D.A.I., the Supreme 
Court assumed that social science research establishing that the 
inability of children to answer questions about the significance of 
truth telling to whether they will actually tell the truth is also 
applicable to cognitively impaired adults. In this context, applying 
social science research about children to cognitively impaired 
adults seems sound.  There may, however, be other situations 
where applying research about children to cognitively impaired 
adults may be more problematic. 
E. Comparing Canadian & American Standards for Child 
Competence 
In most American proceedings, the applicable standard for 
assessing the competence of witnesses is established under Rule 
601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or similar state provisions: a 
witness must be able to “observe, recollect, communicate, and 
appreciate the necessity of telling the truth.”90  This test allows for 
questioning of the child about the meaning of a promise to tell the 
truth and the duty to tell the truth in court.  Therefore, in the 
United States, there continues to be cases where children have 
been ruled incompetent because they cannot give satisfactory 
answers to cognitive questions about the duty to tell the truth.91 
 89.  Id. at para. 52. 
 90.  See, e.g, State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1029 (R.I. 2004) (interpreting 
Rule 601 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence). 
 91.  Angela D. Evans & Thomas D. Lyon, Assessing Children’s 
Competency to Take the Oath in Court: The Influence of Question Type on 
Children’s Accuracy, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 195, 195 (2012). 
 
BALAFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  5:58 PM 
2014] CHILD COMPETENCY TEST 533 
In some cases, it is possible that prosecutors may decide to not call 
young children, or even abandon prosecutions, because of concerns 
about the inability of the child to satisfy the competency standard, 
even though the child may be able to effectively describe his or her 
victimization. 
As discussed above, in Canada the requirement that children 
and other vulnerable witnesses must answer abstract questions to 
demonstrate an understanding of the “duty to speak the truth” 
has been abolished.92 This is consistent with social science 
research establishing that, at least for children, the ability to 
answer this type of cognitive question is not related to actual 
truth-telling behavior. To the extent that children and other 
witnesses are still being precluded from testifying by this type of 
questioning, American law should be changed.  In this area, the 
Canadian model of legislative reform is worthy of serious study in 
the United States. 
The inquiry required by the former Canada Evidence Act and 
still permitted in many American states is upsetting to children, a 
waste of court time, and does nothing to promote the search for 
the truth.  Some children who could give honest, reliable evidence 
may be prevented from testifying, resulting in miscarriages of 
justice.  The present Canadian provision, focusing on a child 
witness’s ability to understand and answer questions, creates a 
much more meaningful test to use to determine whether a child is 
competent to testify. 
Further, as discussed in the next section of this paper, in 
some cases a child may simply not be able to testify in court; in 
these cases, Canada’s reformed hearsay laws have helped prevent 
miscarriages of justice. 
IV: COMMON LAW REFORMS TO CANADA’S HEARSAY LAWS 
A.  The Principled Approach:  Reliability and Necessity 
Not infrequently in child abuse cases, the initial disclosures of 
abuse by the child to a parent, doctor or investigator are graphic 
and highly revealing, and can be important evidence of the child’s 
victimization.  These disclosures are closest in time to the alleged 
 92.  See R. v. Fletcher [1982], 1 C.C.C. 3d 370, 380 (Ont. C.A.), leave 
to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1983] 48 N.R. 319 (S.C.C.). 
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events, and are less likely to be affected by suggestive questions.  
Especially for younger children, statements given soon after the 
events in question may be more complete and detailed than 
evidence given at trial months after the events.  Historically, 
however, these statements were usually excluded as hearsay 
evidence.93  Although the general rules about the exclusion of 
hearsay promote a fair and more focused trial, they can be 
problematic when applied to cases involving young children who 
are victims of abuse, and there are statutory and common law 
exceptions to hearsay rules in both Canada and the United States 
for child victims. 
Until the late 1980s, Canadian courts held that hearsay 
evidence was inadmissible unless it could fit within one of the 
traditional “hearsay exceptions.”94  Few of the exceptions were 
relevant to a typical child abuse case.  However, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has expanded the scope for the admission of 
children’s disclosures of abuse. 
In its 1990 decision in R. v. Khan, a child sexual abuse case, 
the Supreme Court of Canada significantly changed the common 
law rule about admitting hearsay evidence, allowing its admission 
if it is established at a voir dire that the evidence is “reliable” and 
its admission is “necessary.”95  Under this “principled” approach, 
hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, and the onus is 
on the Crown to establish the statement’s admissibility as reliable 
and necessary.96  In Khan, the Supreme Court ruled that a mother 
could testify about a statement made to her by her then three-
year-old daughter about fifteen minutes after an alleged sexual 
assault by the child’s doctor during a medical examination, even 
though the child was ruled incompetent to testify at the trial and 
these statements were hearsay.97  The Supreme Court accepted 
 93.  The definitions of hearsay in Canada resemble those in the United 
States.  See R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653, 661–62 (Can.) (“An out-of-court 
statement which is admitted for the truth of its contents is hearsay.  An out-
of-court statement offered simply as proof that the statement was made is not 
hearsay, and is admissible as long as it has some probative value.”).  
 94.  See, e.g., R. v. O’Brien, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591, 591 (Can.) (holding that 
hearsay statements are inadmissible unless they fall under an exception to 
the hearsay rule). 
 95.  R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 542 (Can.). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 531. 
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that the statement was admissible, establishing a broad and 
principled approach to the admissibility of this type of hearsay 
statement, rather than the traditional specific exception 
approcah.98  Justice McLachlin observed that there is a “need for 
increased flexibility in the interpretation of the hearsay rule to 
permit the admission in evidence of statements made by children 
to others about sexual abuse.”99 She ruled that hearsay 
statements are admissible if they meet the test of “necessity and 
reliability”: 
Necessity for these purposes must be interpreted as 
“reasonably necessary.”  The inadmissibility of the child’s 
evidence might be one basis for a finding of necessity. But 
sound evidence based on psychological assessments that 
testimony in court might be traumatic for the child or 
harm the child might also serve . . . The next question 
should be whether the evidence is reliable. Many 
considerations such as timing, demeanour, the 
personality of the child, the intelligence and 
understanding of the child, and the absence of any reason 
to expect fabrication in the statement may be relevant on 
the issue of reliability.  I would not wish to draw up a 
strict list of considerations for reliability, nor to suggest 
that certain categories of evidence (for example the 
evidence of young children on sexual encounters) should 
be always regarded as reliable.100 
Since Khan, a significant body of jurisprudence has developed 
on the admissibility of children’s out-of-court statements in 
criminal trials.  This type of hearsay evidence is now admitted not 
just for the purposes of supporting the credibility of a child who 
testifies, but also for the “truth of its contents.”101 
Moreover, Canadian courts are now prepared to convict on the 
basis of a child’s hearsay statements about abuse, even if the child 
does not testify.  For example, in its 1993 decision, R. v. J.P., the 
Quebec Court of Appeal applied Khan to uphold the conviction of a 
man charged with sexually abusing his daughter, two years old at 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 543. 
 100.  Id. at 546. 
 101.  Id. at 546 (citing Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608 (Can.)). 
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the time of the alleged offense and 3.5 years at the time of the 
trial.102 The child was not called as a witness, but her mother 
testified about her disclosures of abuse.103  The Court held that 
given the child’s young age, the “necessity” requirement was 
satisfied without the Crown adducing expert or other evidence 
about her incapacity to testify.104  The “reliability” was established 
by the fact that so young a child would not normally fabricate a 
story showing knowledge of sexual activity unless she were 
abused. The allegations were corroborated by medical evidence, 
but the hearsay statement was critical to link the accused with 
the abuse.105 
Since Khan, the Supreme Court has ruled that “necessity” 
means “reasonably necessary” and “must be given a flexible 
definition, capable of encompassing diverse situations.”106 
Necessity is established if the child has been called as a witness 
and determined by the court to be not competent to testify under 
the standard of the Canada Evidence Act.  However, it is not 
essential that the judge hear from the child to establish 
incapacity, and in cases of children who were three years of age, 
judges have taken “judicial notice” of the fact that they are too 
young to testify.107  However, with children age four or older, it is 
not sufficient for the Crown merely to decide not to call the child 
as a witness; rather, the “necessity” should be established during 
voir dire.  Necessity as a result of testimonial incompetence might, 
for example, be established by testimony from a psychologist who 
has interviewed the child and can testify that the child does not 
have sufficient ability to understand and respond to questions 
about the alleged events in court. Necessity may also be 
established if it is shown the child will suffer emotional trauma 
from testifying. In considering the issue of “emotional trauma” as 
a ground for “necessity,” Justice McLachlin stated in R. v. Rockey 
that the test is not one of proving actual psychological injury from 
 102.  R. v. J.P. [1992], 74 CCC 3d 276 (Can. Qc. C.A.), aff’d, R. v. J.P., 
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 469, 469 (Can.).  
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 934 (Can.).   
 107.  See R. v. Peterson, [1996] S.C.C.A 202 (Can.), denying the leave to 
appeal, [1996] 27 O.R. 3d 739, 739 (C.A.).  See also R v. F. (R.G.), [1997] A.J. 
409 (C.A.). 
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testifying: 
Mere discomfort is insufficient to establish necessity. But 
where there is evidence, as here, that an already 
traumatized child might be further traumatized by being 
questioned by strange men in a strange situation, that 
suffices. The Court is not required to wait for proof of 
actual harm to the child.108 
Additionally, when assessing the issues of emotional trauma 
and ability to communicate, the judge should take account of 
whether the child is testifying from behind a screen or by closed 
circuit television, as legislation permits in Canada.109 
The Supreme Court of Canada further displayed sensitivity to 
child witnesses in applying the concept of “necessity” in its 1999 
decision of R. v. F. (W.J.).110  The child was five years old at the 
time of the alleged sexual assaults, and 6.5 years when called as a 
witness.111 At the competence inquiry, she had considerable 
difficulty in communicating her evidence.112  To over one hundred 
questions during the competence inquiry, the child gave no 
response, or only nodded or shook her head, or gave a hand 
gesture response.113  The trial judge ruled her competent to 
testify.114  When asked simple questions about her family or 
school, the child only answered in single words or simple phrases.  
She became totally silent when asked questions about the alleged 
assault.115  The child was excused from the witness stand and the 
Crown then tried to have the child’s out-of-court statements to 
various persons admitted.116 The trial judge ruled that “necessity” 
had not been established since there was no expert evidence to 
establish that the child was “unable” to testify. The Crown 
presented no further evidence and the case against the accused 
was dismissed.117 
 108.  [1996] 3 S.C.R. 829, 846 (Can.). 
 109.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1988, c. C-46, s. 486.2 (Can.). 
 110.  [1999] 3 S.C.R. 569 (Can.). 
 111.  Id. para. 18. 
 112.  Id. para. 20. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. para. 23. 
 117.  Id. para. 25. 
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In ordering a new trial, the majority of the Supreme Court 
ruled that the trial judge erred in not admitting the hearsay 
evidence.118 Justice McLachlin recognized that the child was 
“paralyzed by the court proceedings.”119 The child was emotionally 
overwhelmed by being in an unfamiliar room with “imposing and 
intimidating strangers” and being asked questions about 
“upsetting and highly personal events.” In this setting, some 
children will “find themselves unable to respond [to questions] in 
any meaningful way.”120 Testimony from a mental health 
professional to explain the child’s inability to testify may be 
desirable, but it is not essential. The Supreme Court accepted that 
where it is “self-evident or evident from the proceedings” that a 
child cannot give her “evidence in a meaningful way” the necessity 
for admission of a child’s out-of-court statements is established.121 
In order for a child’s hearsay statement to be admitted, it 
must also be found to be “reliable.”  Reliability for the purpose of 
admissibility is decided on the balance of probabilities at the time 
that the Crown seeks to have the statement admitted, but the 
ultimate assessment of guilt (and reliability of a hearsay 
statement of a child that abuse occurred) must be established 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” after an assessment of all of the 
evidence.122  The test of reliability is a “threshold” test that 
establishes “a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness;” to be 
admissible it is not necessary to establish “ultimate or certain 
reliability,” which can only be determined at the end of the 
trial.123  The reliability requirement is aimed at identifying those 
cases where the concerns arising from the inability to test the 
evidence are sufficiently addressed to justify receiving the 
evidence as an exception to the general exclusionary hearsay 
rule.  The reliability requirement will usually be met by showing 
either that there is no real concern about whether the statement 
is true because of the circumstances in which it was made or 
because, despite being hearsay, its truth and accuracy can 
 118.  Id. para. 51. 
 119.  Id. para. 50. 
 120.  Id. para. 43.  
 121.  Id. para. 41. 
 122.  R. v Khelowan, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, para. 57 (Can.). 
 123.  Id. para. 90 (quoting R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, para 75 
(Can.)). 
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nonetheless be sufficiently tested by means other than 
contemporaneous cross-examination.  These two principal ways of 
satisfying the reliability requirement are not mutually exclusive 
categories and they assist in identifying the factors that need to be 
considered on the admissibility inquiry.124 
An explicit hearsay statement of a young child about sexual 
abuse is generally considered sufficiently reliable to be admitted 
into evidence, because young children do not ordinarily have 
knowledge about sexual matters and thus are unlikely to fabricate 
allegations on their own.125  However, there are examples of 
where a child’s hearsay statements are not reliable. If, for 
example, there is evidence that a girl engaged in sexual activities 
with an older brother and that she tended to lie to deny that such 
activity took place between them, the child’s statement to her 
foster mother about alleged sexual abuse by her father would be 
just “as consistent with the hypothesis that she was protecting” 
her brother as with her having been sexually abused by her 
father, and hence the statement is unreliable hearsay and 
inadmissible.126 
B. Video-Recorded Police Interviews:  The Code Section 715.1 and 
the Common Law 
Today in Canada, one of the most commonly admitted types of 
children’s hearsay evidence is a video-recording of an investigative 
police interview with a child.  If the child testifies, the admission 
of the recording is governed by statute, but if the child does not 
testify, the common law hearsay approach of Khan is applied.  
Unlike in the United States, there is no distinction between 
“testimonial” and “non-testimonial hearsay,” though Canadian 
courts are also concerned about issues of reliability and fairness to 
the accused when deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence. 
The practice of police video-recording of statements of child 
witnesses is now universal in Canada. The practice started 
originally in the 1980s for the purpose of reducing the need to 
subject the child to repeated interviews, by allowing the video-
recording to be shared with investigators from different agencies 
 124.  Khelowan, [2006] S.C.R. at para. 57. 
 125.  R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 542 (Can.). 
 126.  R. v. D.R., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291, 310 (Can.).  
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as well as with therapists. Repeated interviewing is potentially 
traumatic, and may affect the reliability of a child’s memory.127  
The enactment of Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code in 1988 has 
encouraged the practice of recording the interviews. This provision 
allows for the admission in evidence of video-recordings of 
interviews with children under the age of eighteen in regard to 
sexual offenses, provided that (1) the recording is made within a 
“reasonable time” of the events in question and (2) the child 
testifies and “adopts” the contents of the recording while on the 
stand.128  Further, dramatic improvements in the quality and 
accessibility of recording equipment, and reductions in cost and 
complexity of its use, have made recording of all types of police 
interviews with suspects, accused persons and witnesses a 
standard police practice. 
The constitutional validity of Section 715.1 of the Criminal 
Code has been upheld in a number cases.  In one of these decisions 
in 1993, R v. D.O.L., the Supreme Court of Canada through Chief 
Justice Lamer, observed: 
By allowing for the videotaping of evidence under certain 
express conditions, section 715.1 not only makes 
participation in the criminal justice system less stressful 
and traumatic for child and adolescent complainants, but 
also aids in the preservation of evidence and the 
discovery of truth.129 
The rights of the accused are adequately protected because, 
under this provision, the child must (1) be a witness, (2) “adopt” 
the contents of the video-record while testifying, and (3) be 
available for cross-examination about its contents.130 
In another decision from 1997, R. v. F. (C.C.), the Supreme 
Court of Canada considered psychological research on children’s 
memories (although the Court did not refer to any specific studies 
and instead used judicial notice to summarize this knowledge).131 
 127.  Laura Melnyk, Angela M. Crossman, & Matthew H. Scullin, The 
Suggestibility of Children’s Memory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS 
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR EVENTS 401, 405 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 
2007). 
 128.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1988, c. C-46, s. 715.1 (Can.). 
 129.  [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 421 (Can.). 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  R. v. F. (C.C.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1183, para. 19 (Can.). 
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Justice Cory stated that a video recording “will almost inevitably 
reflect a more accurate recollection of the events than will 
testimony given later at a trial.”132  He ruled that a child who was 
testifying had “adopted” the videotape if she “recalled giving the 
statement and testified that she was then attempting to be honest 
and truthful.”133  It is not necessary for the child to have a 
recollection of the events while testifying; it is sufficient for her to 
recollect having made the videotaped statement.134  At the trial 
level in this case, the six-year-old children had some recollection of 
the acts of sexual abuse committed by her father, but there were 
some inconsistencies between the videotape and her trial 
testimony.135  The trial judge admitted the videotape and 
convicted the accused.136  In upholding the conviction, Justice 
Cory accepted that these were “minor inconsistencies regarding 
peripheral details” and commented: 
Obviously a contradicted videotape may well be given less 
weight in the final determination of the issues. However, 
the fact that the video is contradicted in cross-
examination does not necessarily mean that the video is 
wrong or unreliable. The trial judge may still conclude . . . 
that the inconsistencies are insignificant and find the 
video more reliable than the evidence elicited at trial . . . 
Although the trier of fact must be wary of any evidence 
which has been contradicted, this is a matter which goes 
to [its] weight . . . and not to its admissibility.137 
Thus, judges have accepted that if there are inconsistencies 
between what a young child says on a video recording made 
shortly after the events in question and what is said at trial many 
months, and even years after the events in question, the video 
may be regarded as “more reliable.”138  However, if the child on 
the stand has no real recollection of the events in question and 
there is a lack of corroborating evidence, it may be appropriate to 
 132.  Id. at para. 19. 
 133.  Id. at para. 36. 
 134.  Id. at para. 4. 
 135.  Id. at para. 5. 
 136.  Id at paras. 1–2. 
 137.  Id. at paras. 47–48. 
 138.  R. v. Vanderwerff, [2006] A.J. No. 620 (Alta. Q.B.). 
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acquit the accused, despite the existence of a video-recording of 
the child that implicates him.139  Further, video recordings may 
even benefit the accused.  If the child has been subject to 
inappropriate, suggestive questions during the video-recorded 
interview, this may be captured on the recording and available to 
protect an accused from unreliable allegations. 
To better understand how video-recording accommodates 
child witnesses, an explanation of the process may help: It is 
common practice for a child to be shown the video-record by the 
prosecutor prior to the child taking the witness stand in order to 
prepare the child for testifying. The video is usually shown again 
at the start of examination-in-chief, and the child is asked to 
“adopt” the contents.  If the child acknowledges the truth of the 
statement in examination-in-chief, but then in cross-examination 
makes inconsistent statements or partially recants, courts have 
generally relied on Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code to rule the 
statement admissible for the truth of its contents.  For example, in 
R. v. B.G.B., Justice Dunnet observed, “the test for ‘adoption’ is 
not stringent.”140  The judge upheld a conviction where a five-
year-old child adopted his statement during examination-in-chief, 
but during cross-examination made some statements inconsistent 
and contradictory to the statements on the video.141 
In cases where the child is not competent to testify or might 
be traumatized by the process of testifying, a video-recording of a 
police interview will not be admissible under Section 715.1 of the 
Code as the child cannot “adopt” it. However, it may be admissible 
under the Khan test of “necessity” and “reliability.”142 
Further, in cases involving children who have recanted their 
allegations, it has been accepted that the critical question is the 
“reliability” of the prior statement. There may be sufficient 
assurance of “threshold reliability” arising from the circumstances 
that the statement may be admissible even if not made under oath 
or promise to tell the truth.143  This approach to admissibility of a 
 139.  R. v. C.L.P., [2006] B.C.P.C. 401, para. 22 (Can.). 
 140.  2005 CanLII 46743, para. 19 (Can. Ont. S.C.). See also R. v. J.R., 
2006 CanLII 31304 (Can. Ont. S.C.). 
 141.  B.G.B., 2005 CanLII 46743 at para. 19. 
 142.  R. v. Collura, 1996 CanLII 8336, para. 8 (Can. B.C.C.A.). 
 143.  When witnesses at trial are recanting their previous statements to 
the police, the Canadian courts generally impose a ‘KGB requirement.’  The 
‘KGB requirement’ for the admission of previous inconsistent statements and 
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video-recording of a police interview with a recanting child is 
illustrated by the 2007 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
R. v. R. (T.).144  During the trial of that case, a twelve-year-old girl 
testified and recanted the allegations of sexual abuse that she had 
made against her father in a video-recorded police interviews.145  
Consequently, she had not adopted the contents of the video-
recording under Section 715.1 of the Code.  However, the trial 
judge held that the video-recorded statement met the reliability 
standard for admissibility under the common law test of R. v. 
Khan.146  The Court reasoned that the circumstances surrounding 
the recording of the statement suggested that the child understood 
the importance of telling the truth, and did so even though the 
statement was not made under oath.147  In addition, the defense’s 
ability to cross-examine the child at trial was another factor that 
favored the admission of the hearsay evidence.  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals held that the evidence suggesting that the recantation 
might be true did not render the video-recorded statement 
inadmissible under Khan, but related to the “ultimate assessment 
of the actual probative value of the evidence.”148  Therefore, the 
recording was admissible for the truth of its contents and could be 
the basis for a conviction, of course, assessed in the context of all 
of the evidence. 
C. Comparing the American and Canadian Approaches to Child’s 
Hearsay 
The “principled approach” of Khan and the Canadian courts to 
hearsay has resulted in a significant expansion of the scope for the 
admission of children’s disclosures and first reports of abuse, 
their use for establishing the truth of their contents (and not merely 
impeaching the credibility of the witness) was established by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, 742 (Can.).  If the 
previous statement is to be admitted for the truth of its contents; the 
previous statement will only be admissible if the police conducting the 
interview had the witness make the statement under oath or a promise to tell 
the truth, and provided an explicit warning of the possibility of the legal 
consequences of making a false statement.  Id. 
 144.  [2007], 85 O.R. 3d 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.).  
 145.  Id. para. 1. 
 146.  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 542 (Can.). 
  147.     Id.  
 148.  T. (R.), 85 O.R. 3d at para. 21. 
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allowing the trier of fact, whether a judge or a jury, to consider 
“reliable” information to facilitate the search for the truth.  This 
approach is similar to that of the United States Supreme Court in 
its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts, with its focus on “indicia of 
reliability.”149  The general Roberts approach was, of course, 
abrogated in 2007 by Crawford v. Washington,150 with its 
distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay in 
the Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.  The 
Crawford decision has potentially significant implications for the 
admissibility of children’s hearsay statements, and in particular, 
on investigative interviews with police, doctors, and child 
protection workers.  To date, there have been conflicting appellate 
decisions on the applicability of Crawford to the statements of 
children to police and other investigators.  The Supreme Court of 
the United States has yet to rule on this issue, though a number of 
scholars have argued that there should be a more flexible 
approach to the admission of children’s hearsay disclosures of 
abuse;151 such an approach would facilitate the search for the 
truth without jeopardizing the right to a fair trial, and would 
recognize the special vulnerability of children. 
While the Canadian Charter does not have a “confrontation 
clause,” it does guarantee the right to a “fair trial.”  One would 
hope that in applying Crawford and the Confrontation Clause to 
statements of children, the U.S. Supreme Court will follow a 
similar approach as adopted in Canada, allowing the trier of fact 
to have access to reliable statements of children.  The fact that the 
statements are admitted is distinct from the ultimate question of 
guilt of the defendant, which must be proven beyond reasonable a 
doubt.  To deny the trier of fact the opportunity to consider such 
evidence may deny access to what is often the best evidence 
available of what occurred. 
V. CONCLUSION:  REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The criminal justice system is not only concerned with 
 149.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66–68 (1980). 
 150.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004). 
 151.  See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation in Children’s Cases: The 
Dimensions of Limited Coverage, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 393, 394–95 (2012); see also 
Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation 
Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1199 (2012). 
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ascertaining the truth but also with fairness, due process, and the 
protection of the constitutional rights of the accused.  Further, 
while most disclosures of child abuse are true, there continue to be 
a relatively small number of unfounded allegations.  For example, 
a child may be mistaken about what occurred, may have identified 
the wrong perpetrator, or may have been induced by inappropriate 
questioning into making a false allegation; more rarely, children 
may fabricate allegations on their own.152  The state has the 
burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
by a fair process and, inevitably, there will be some true 
allegations of child abuse that cannot be proven in court. 
The role of the criminal justice system, starting with the 
police investigation and ending in court, is to balance the rights of 
the accused with the desire to ascertain the truth and protect 
victims.  Over the past three decades, there has been a substantial 
increase in understanding the capacities and needs of child 
witnesses and victims of child abuse, which have led to dramatic 
improvements in the treatment of child victims in the criminal 
justice systems of both Canada and the United States. Legal 
changes have both reflected and contributed to a better 
understanding of the nature and effects of child abuse.  Both 
countries now deal more effectively with child abuse, and report a 
decline in levels of abuse, especially child sexual abuse.153 
There is, however, a continuing need to further reform the 
justice system to find a better balance between the rights of the 
accused and the interests of children and society. Further 
improvements will require consideration of experiences in other 
countries,154 as well as more empirical research about the 
experiences of children in court and the long-term effects of the 
involvement of the justice system. 
 152.  Nicholas M.C. Bala et al., Sexual Abuse Allegations and Parental 
Separation: Smokescreen or Fire? 13 J. FAM. STUD. 1, 1 (2007). 
 153.  See, e.g., Child Abuse Is on the Decline – Now What?, NATIONAL 
CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY CENTRE, http://www.nationalcac.org/ncac-blog/child-
abuse-is-on-the-decline-now-what.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014); but see 
Delphine Collin-Vézina et al., Is Child Abuse Declining in Canada? An 
Analysis of Child Welfare Data, 34 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 807 (2010). 
 154.  England has undertaken a number of reforms, and proposed others, 
that are worthy of careful study in Canada and the USA.  See, e.g., Matthew 
Hall, Giving Evidence at Age 4: Just Means to Just Ends?, 39 FAM. L. 608, 
608–11 (2009). 
 
